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Introduction
The prospect of a second organizational amnesty is an important topic Such a topic is I
think appropriately linked to a conference that is fundamentally about assessing the work of the
TRC process Indeed, our conference was opened with an address by a TRC Commissioner,
Yasmin Sooka. stating that opposition to a second amnesty would be a significant concrete result
of this conference Additionally, in at least in some of the panel discussions, that theme has also
been raised This paper aims to explore the question of what the TRC process so far has to say
about a second amnesty and what a second amnesty would have to say about the TRC process It
concludes that within certain constraints a collective amnesty may be constitutional but a blanket
amnesty would not be
The first section reviews the interface between constitutionalism, the TRC process, and
the South African judiciary The second section examines some of the media speculation over a
second organizational amnesty It lays out at least two different ideas of what such an amnesty
might consist of: a blanket amnesty and a collective amnesty The final two sections tentatively
evaluate the question of a second organizational amnesty (in its different manifestations) first from
point of view of the doctrinal constitutionalism of the legal sector and second from the point of
view of the constitutionalism of a more sociological definition
Before I do so, a professional caveat is in order. In the making of history, lawyers often
venture where historians fear to tread. This is meant in two senses. In one sense, the work of
lawyers isoften a focus of the later research of historians. Indeed, lawyers often think that their
work should be THE focus, although historians often disagree. In an additional sense of making
history lawyers also often precede historians. As part of their work of persuading decision-
makers lawyers often need to write a history (and to do so quickly) Likewise, judges often
engage in the quick production of a history ' In so doing, these lawyers are usually criticized for
telling stories in partial and instrumental ways and so they should be So should historians. The
following account should be taken as a lawyer's rather than as a historian's history.
;
 See. e g , the first two paragraphs of AZAPO where Constitutional Court Judge Ismail
Mahorned (who has since become Chief Justice with the Supreme Court of Appeal) begins with
ore se-.tence (For decades South African history has been dominated by a deep conflict betweer
a mine :ity which reserved for itself all control over the political instruments of the State and a
major.;, who sought to resist that domination ") and ends with the following sentence ("It miglr
be ncessary in crucial areas to close the book on the past.'").
I. Constitutionalism, Organizations, and the TRC Process
Constitutionalism can be seen as a cultural construction resulting from popular and elite
participation in institutions of formal constitution-making (Klaaren 1998; Klug 1996). This
definition of constitutionalism goes beyond formal doctrine. It also uses the concept of an
organization as a mediating category between popular and elite participation on the one hand and
notions of the people, the nation, or the Constitution on the other. In the instance of the TRC
process, the TRC both established important linkages itself with other organizations through inter
alia the sectoral hearings, but also provided an organizational focus for the more diffuse popular
participation in the process This definition of constitutionalism borrows a fair amount from new
institutionalism theory within the sociology of organizations (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). This
theory contrasts itself with some of its predecessors by claiming to focus less on normative
structures and informal value systems and more on cognitive processes and formal symbolism It
has been criticized for downgrading issues regarding power and conflicts of interest.
In terms of this definition, both the South African judiciary and the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission itself have been involved in the production of constitutionalfsm.
Indeed, insofar as the TRC process is concerned, the courts and the TRC Commission have
mutually engaged in such a production.2 While the TRC's legislative underpinnings were upheld
in principle by the Constitutional Court in the case of AZAPO v President of the Republic of
South Africa. 1996 (4) SA 671 (CC). the Commissions administrative operations have been
subject to rather close and exacting judicial scrutiny by the lower courts since that initial decision
Likewise, while the TRC attempted to cast its project of accounting for apartheid over the legal
sector including the judiciary, the South African judiciary refused to come in person before the
TRC. choosing instead to submit only written representations.' Seeing the TRC process as a
signitlcant (though far from determinative) site of production of South African constitutionalism,
that process demonstrated that as of 1998, the institutional role of the courts within the South
African constitutional democracy remained yet to be defined (Klaaren 1998).
If the place of the judiciary within South African constitutionalism remains yet to be
specified, the question of a second organizational amnesty - spoken seriously about in the media
over the past several weeks - demonstrates the mirror point that the place of the TRC process
itself within South African constitutionalism also remains yet to be specified While such an
assertion may initially seem odd (since this conference is billed as beginning the historical
assessment of the TRC, regarding that process as a finished chapter), it is oddly appropriate
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 In Klaaren 1998. I spoke of "the TRC", meaning :he Commission established in terms ••
the Promotion of the National Unity and Reconciliation Ac: 34 of 1995 I now use the tern the
TRC process meaning a wider process centred on the TRC
New institutionalism theory would be particular!;, apt in exploring the sectoral hcirtr.±
oiVe TRC. since this theory sees instiiutionalization operr/.ng at a sectoral, inter-organizcv j r ^
le-.i.
(given the constructivist nature of much of the social theory at this conference) that the
contribution that the TRC process may or may not have made to constitutionalism remains an
account to be battled over.
II. A Second Amnesty?
Apart from its importance as a topic, the content of a second amnesty is much less clear
Indeed, at the time of writing and presenting this paper, the status and shape of a second amnesty
is uncertain. Discussions are reported to be presently taking place between (at least) the
Department of Justice and the Cabinet of incoming President-designate Thabo Mbeki on this topic
with at least some legal advice being commissioned by the Department of Justice.
The political impetus for such a second amnesty appears to come from three sources
Two of these can be gleaned from President-designate Mbeki's own words who broached the
topic in the following terms (Steinberg 1999):
"Quite a lot of people in KwaZulu-Natal did not apply (for amnesty) and with the level o(
violence that took place in that province, if you dig and dig and dig, you are going to haw-
to arrest a lot of people That can't be right. A number of generals in the SA Defence
Force (SADF) are very keen that this matter be dealt with. [] because their own sense too.
is that there may very well be significant numbers of people in the former SADF who
didn't apply, and again, with regards to them, it would not be right week after week to
charge people with something that happened in 1987 "
The third potential source that Mbeki apparently did not explicitly mention is the top leadership of
the ANC and other political organizations. As is well-known, 37 top ANC leaders collectively
applied for amnesty in terms of the TRC legislation and had their application refused on the
grounds that the TRC legislation did not allow for amnesty to be granted collectively. Indeed.
Mbeki's call was reported to be for a new amnesty law that would allow "organisations and
bodies" rather than individuals to be granted collective amnesty (Steinberg 1999).
In considering this second organizational amnesty, we need to distinguish clearly betv. eer.
two separate forms of amnesty, both of which differ from the amnesty offered by the TRC proce>-
to date The first is the idea of a blanket amnesty. This is the notion that the criminal (and civil
liability for certain classes of human rights violations is extinguished for all persons or at leas: for
all persons within a certain time or space. The amnesty eradicates the criminality of the actic r.s
themselves. One cannot be prosecuted in a court of law for such actions. Nor may a person be
sued in the civil courts for de'.ictual or other damages arising out of such violations
The second is the idea of a collective amnesty This is quite a bit different than the idea
of a blanket amnesty The liability for a certain class of gross human rights violations is not
legally extinguished for all persons. Instead, the criminal (and civil) liability of only a certain . l a -
of persons (e.g. members of en organization or a certain class of organizations! for those hurra;
rights violations which have been adjudged to fall within the terms of the amnesty legislation is
extinguished. The criminality of the specified actions remains but its attachment to certain
specified persons is precluded Furthermore, the legal definition of a "person" may include not
only real live human beings but also juristic persons (organizations recognized with legal
personality such as a corporation or a political party) so that the organizations themselves may be
granted immunity As defined here, a collective amnesty differs from the present process only in
allowing for either an organization or members of an organization to claim immunity by virtue of
that membership.
In speaking about a second amnesty, it is not completely clear whether President Mbeki
was speaking of a blanket amnesty (e.g. for all gross human rights violation in KwaZulu-Natal
within a certain period of time) or of a collective amnesty As explored in greater detail in the
next two sections, he would be well-advised to avoid the first and to investigate carefully the
details of the second
111. The Doctrinal Constitutionality of a Second Organizational Amnesty
The constitutionality of the different ideas of a second organizational amnesty can be
evaluated in at least two ways. The first would be the way of professional lawyers: in terms of
legal doctrine The second would be in terms of the more sociological definition of
constitutionalism which examines popular and elite participation in processes of constitution
making. This section considers the doctrinal constitutionality of a second organizational amnesty
by first identifying the rationale of the AZAPO case and then applying to to the concept of a
second amnesty
A. The AZAPO Reasoning of the Constitutional Court
The analysis here will likely begin with the Constitutional Court's decision in A2AP0 v
President of th>: Republic of South Africa. In this case, victims of apartheid abuses including the
widow cf Sieve Biko challenged the key amnesty-granting section of the TRC legislation. The
victims argued that the immunities granted to individual perpetrators from criminal and civil
liabilii;. ws: a violation uf their right of access to court in terms of the Interim Constitution in •
force (iargciyi since April 1994 (The Interim Constitution was (largely) replaced by the 1996
Constitution on 4 February 1997 ) This immunity also meant that in respect of the acts for which
amnesty was granted there would be no vicarious liability for either the State (if the wrongdoer
was an employee of the State) or other bodies, organisations, or person (if, e.g., the wrongdoer
was a member of such an organisation). AZAPO para 7. The Constitutional Court unanimously
rejected the victims' challenge There were two broad themes to the Court's reasoning: the
transitional imperative and the specific features of the truth-for-amnesty mechanism
I. The Transitional Imperative Justification
In adverting r. the transi;ional imperative. :he Coun relied heavily on the placement or'.1.:
epilogue in the interim Constitution mandating Parliament to pass such amnesty-granting
legislation. Entitled 'National Unity and Reconciliation', this epilogue contained some of most
inspiring and transformative language of the Interim Constitution (Klare 1998) The epilogue
provided in part:
In order to advance . . . reconciliation and reconstruction, amnesty shall be granted in
respect of acts, omissions and offences associated with political objectives and committed
in the court of the conflicts of the past. To this end. Parliament under this Constitution
shall adopt a law determining a firm cut-off date . . . and providing for the mechanisms,
criteria and procedures, including tribunals, if any, through which such amnesty shall be
dealt with at any time after the law has been passed
Indeed, in the Court's view, the amnesty legislation was very likely a necessary precondition to ;i
successfully negotiated transition. AZAPO para 19. Surveying some of the international
experience with amnesties, Mahomed J concluded:
Decisions of States in transition, taken with a view to assisting such transition, are quite
different from acts of a State covering up its own crimes by granting itself immunity In
the former case, it is not a question of the governmental agents responsible for the
violations indemnifying themselves, but rather one of a constitutional compact being
entered into by all sides, with former victims being well-represented, as part of an ongoing
process to develop constitutional democracy and prevent a repetition of the abuses
AZAPO para 24.
The Court's examination of international law and its effect on the issue has been rightly
characterized as brief and incomplete though not necessarily incorrect (Dugard 1998, 1997)
Speaking of the immunity from criminal liability, Mahomed J characterized the South African
version of amnesty in the following significant terms:
The amnesty contemplated is not a blanket amnesty against criminal prosecution for all
and sundry, granted automatically as a uniform act of compulsory statutory amnesia It is
specifically authorised for the purposes of effecting a constructive transition towards a
democratic order. It is available only where there is a full disclosure of all facts to the
.Amnesty Committee and where it is clear that the particular transgression was perpetrated
during the prescribed period and with a political objective committed in the course of the
conflicts of the past. That objective has to be evaluated having regard to the careful
criteria listed in s 20(3) of the Act, including the very important relationship which the act
perpetrated bears in proportion to the object pursued AZAPO para 32
This analysis may be merely descrip:ive but by distinguishing South Africa's TRC process from a
blanket amnesty and by placing tha: TRC process firmly within "a constructive transition to a
democratic order" may also be interpreted to signal a presumption agair.si a blanket amnesr
2. The Truth for Amnesty Justification
In analyzing the actual amnesty-granting mechanism, the Court considered initially its
provision of immunity from criminal liability for individuals. Again indicating a presumption
against a blanket amnesty, the Court first began by noting that the grant of amnesty was not
blanket Amnesty was only to be granted for those acts which were associated with a political
objective. Moreover, this issue was to be determined independently by the Amnesty Committee
according to a number of specific criteria set out in the legislation. AZAPO para 20. Second, the
grant of amnesty was justified in terms of the necessary condition it provided for the full voluntary-
disclosure of information by the perpetrators, with the truth being seen as a compensatory benefit
for the victim AZAPO para 20
With respect to immunity from civil liability, the considerations were essentially no
ditTerent at the individual level Here, the Court stated specifically that immunity from the very-
substantial damages would also provide a necessary condition for Rill voluntary disclosure of
information by perpetrators AZAPO paras 33-38
With respect to the effect of the amnesty on the civil liability of political organisations, the
Court wrote a single brief paragraph, treating the issue along similar lines as the immunity for
individuals. Here, the immunity was again justified on the grounds of the transitional imperative
and as a necessary condition for disclosure of the truth. AZAPO para 49. Here, the Court
appeared to recognize that individuals might well feel dependent on the direct or indirect support
of those political organisations and thus discouraged from fully disclosing the truih were the
organisation itself not immune from civil liability.
However, with respect to the effect of amnesty on any potential civil liability of the State,
the Court dropped one justification (disclosure of information) and added another (the starving
school children rationale). Here, the victims (and the amicus curiae from the Centre for Applied
Legal Studies) argued forcefully that immunity from such liability was not a necessary condition
for full disclosure of information For that, criminal and civil liability for the individual were
sufficient. Mahomed J's judgment treated this point seriously and essentially conceded the
validity of the victims'argument. AZAPO para 41. Nonetheless, the Court fell back on the »
transitional imperative point and upheld this feature of the TRC legislation AZAPO paras 42
Above and beyond the transitional imperative. Mahomed J raised a further justification (AZAPO
paras 43-48) by asking whether the resources of the State should be directed to compensating the
victims of torture and abuse or also to the "other victims" of the broader injustices of apartheid
manifested in areas such as education, housing, and primary health care:
Those negotiators of the Constitution and leaders of the nation whc were required to
address themselves to these agonising problems must have been compelled to make hard
choices They could have chosen to saddle the State with liabilir. f i r claims made b>
insurance companies which had compensated institutions for delicr_al ar .s performed b>
the servants of the State and to the extent again divert funds otherwise desperately needc.:
to provide food for the hungry, roofs for the homeless and blackboards and desks for
those struggling to obtain admission to desperately overcrowded schools They were
entitied to permit that the claims of such school children and the poor and the homeless to
be preferred AZAPO para 44.
Whereas individual immunity was justified on grounds of the transitional imperative plus the
rationale of full disclosure, the more difficult issue of State immunity was justified on the grounds
of the transitional imperative and the rationale of preferring starving school children over greedy
insurance companies. It should be noted that the Court's rationale here is that this was a choice
within the discretion of the negotiators of the transitional constitution, not necessarily within the
discretion of a democratically elected Parliament
The separate concurring judgment of Didcott J dealt primarily with the difficult issue of
immunity for state civil liability. Didcott J specifically rejected Mahomed J's preference for the
countless victims of apartheid on grounds of principle. As Didcott J put it: "[T]he lack of a rijjlu
by the many can scarcely provide a sound excuse for its denial to others, be they relatively but
few, whose title to it is clear." AZAPO para 55 So why did Didcott J not dissent0 Interpreting
the text of the epilogue, he felt that immunity for the State would be "in the interests of putting an
early end to unfruitful recriminations" that would be spawned by ongoing litigation. AZAPO para
59. Further, he pointed to the epilogue's use of the term "the need for reparation" and observed
that the TRC legislation at least "offers such quid pro quo for the loss [of the victims] and
establishes the machinery for determining such alternative redress " AZAPO para 65
B. The Principles of AZAPO Applied to n Second Amnesty
1. Blanket Amnesty is Unconstitutional
Relatively quick work can be made of the constitutionality of a blanket amnesty. It is
unconstitutional. Unless such a law makes provision for the dual elements of (1) linkage of the
liability-generating acts to a political objective (2) as determined by an independent and impartial
decisionmaker such as the TRC Amnesty Committees, such a blanket amnesty is a non-starter as
it offends the presumption against a blanket amnesty that the AZAPO Court identified. The
principle may be stated as follows: in terms of South African constitutional lav.. amnesty may only
be granted for acts which have been determined to fall within the terms of the amnesty-granting
legislation by an independent and impartial decisionmaker. Such a decisionmaker could be either
the ordinary courts or an independent and impartial tribunal. This would be sc whether the
transitional imperative was seen to persist or notJ
4
 It cou!d be argued that the AZAPO requirement of a independent a r : impartial
determination that a specific act falls within the scope of amnesty legislation f. .'.vs directly fron.
the epilogue a r : not from the Constitutional more generally, but such an argument would seeir
weak
This conclusion that there is a constitutional presumption against a blanket amnesty has an
important consequence in dealing with the class of acts for which persons have not applied for
amnesty in terms of the TRC process. It is thus a requirement under the 1996 Constitution that
either the ordinary courts or an independent and impartial tribunal be the institution to deal with
the class of acts for which persons have not applied for amnesty. As we will see below, this has
important consequences for the precise form of the second amnesty.
2. With Safeguards, Collective Amnesty Is Constitutional for Organizations and
Individuals But Likely Not for the State
Take the issue of collective amnesty. AZAPO's reasoning reveals no presumptive
objection to granting immunity from criminal or civil liability to organisations and bodies Indeed,
that decision upheld such an organizational grant of immunity grant at least with respect to acts
for which individuals had applied for amnesty. There is no presumptive objection to the granting
of amnesty to organisations or bodies
If there is no in-principle objection to the notion of a collective amnesty, can its undeniable
infringement of the rights of the victims be justified?' To do this, we must first answer the
question of when the transitional imperative expires and then examine the different aspects of a
collective amnesty: individual, organizational and state immunity from liability
Is the Transitional Game Over Yet?
The exercise of deciding when the transition is over is important to the topic of the
constitutionality in both substantive and doctrinal ways. Substantively. if the transitional
imperative has expired, then the full force of Steinberg's argument (1999) can be felt:
[l]n the AZAPO case, the Constitutional Court did not need to speculate, tt had before i:
in black and white the negotiated terms of SA's transition to democracy. It: knew of an
agreement between the protagonists that constitutional democracy would never be born
unless justice was suspended. Ruling against amnesty then would have been a rash and
arrogant betrayal of those who made constitutionalism itself possible. But that was then
It may be that what is worrying Vlbeki is the question of governance. SA would
be a more difficult place to govern if trials about apartheid era deeds hit the court rolls
every year. Perhaps such trials would indeed produce a political culture that looks
backwards rather than forwards Perhaps it would make it harder to reconfigure the
political terrain into shapes undreamed of under apartheid. Perhaps Mbeki's dream of
government by broad-based consensus would wither and die
s
 AZAPO para 9 found easih that an amnesty infringed the right of access to ccuns
entrenched in section 22 of tiie Inien-i Constitution. Essentially the same right is entrenched ir
section 34 of the 1996 Constitution
S
Yet if this is the case we are no longer bartering justice for the future of
constitutional democracy, but for convenience. We are saying that suspending justice is
not a condition of the new order's survival, but a condition of making it easier to manage
If that is the case, it is not at all clear that the barter is an acceptable one, for we are no
longer suspending the rule of law in order to protect its posterity; its posterity is already ;i>
sure as it can be
Doctrinally, if the transitional imperative has expired, then the evaluation of the limitation
of the victims' rights by a collective amnesty will need to be judged not against the text of the
epilogue of the Interim Constitution with its specific reference mandating such a law but rather
against the text of the general limitations clause (subsection 36(1)) of the 1996 Constitution In
such a latter case, the limitations analysis would need to demonstrate consistency with judgments
about any other limitation of a fundamental right Presumably, with the transitional imperative
expired, an evaluation under the general limitations clause of the 1996 Constitution would be le>s
friendly to an amnesty law than was the evaluation in AZAPO in terms of the text of the epilogue
to the interim Constitution.
These arguments make it important to determine when the transitional imperative ends
One can locate the time at which the constitutional transitional imperative expires at different
points In discussing the need for an anti-defection clause, 1 argued previously that the transition
ended when the 1996 Constitution was submitted to the Constitutional Court for certification in
May 1996 and when the National Party left the Government of National Unity (GNU) (Klaaren
1997) More formally (given IFP's continued participation in the GNU), one could identify the
recent (30 April 1999) lapsing of the constitutional provisions maintaining the legislative and
executive structures of the GNU as the endpoint of the transitional imperative
General legal arguments for continuing the transitional imperative beyond 30 April 1999
are hard to come by, but one specifically applicable to the TRC process certainly exists. Consider
item 22 of Schedule 6 of the 1996 Constitution. For the purposes of the TRC legislation ( eg
The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995. as amended), this item
deems part of the 1996 Constitution all the provisions of the interim Constitution dealing with
amnesty This has an important legislative drafting consequence. It is possible to take advantage
of the transitional imperative justification if one is amending the TRC legislation, rather than
drafting a new law.
The Bottom Lines of Collective Amnesty: Individuals, Organisations, and the State
In drar.ing legislation to give effect to a second amnesty, there are two legal routes to
take amendir; the existing TRC legislation or drafting a new and separate piece of legislation
Amending the Current Act There are some clear legal consecuences to starting dov.:
the path of amending the currently existing TRC legislation 6 In particular, drafting a package of
amendments to the existing TRC legislation would most likely tie a collective amnesty to the
package of procedures currently specified in the Act. These include a fair degree of publicity,
strong victims' rights of participation and confrontation, and an attenuated right to reparations.
Moreover, the acts within the scope of such a package of amendments could only be limited to
those gross human rights violations committed up to and including May 1994.'
Constitutional evaluation of such a package of amendments would ask to what extent is
the model of the current TRC legislation being deviated from. Formally, this question would be
framed as what scope did the epilogue to the Interim Constitution allow the drafters of the initial
TRC legislation. AZAPO paras 44-48 In this exercise, the TRC legislation should be taken as
indicative of that range of action
Providing for leaders of organizations and the organizations themselves to receive
immunity in respect of acts for which amnesty has been granted in terms of the TRC legislation
would not seem a large deviation. Indeed, it has been argued that creatively interpreted (as the
Amnesty Committee did not do in considering the application of the 37 ANC leaders), the present
legislation allows for collective amnesty However, providing organisational immunity with
respect to acts not determined to fall within the terms of the TRC Act would stray into the
category of a blanket amnesty and should thus be ruled out as too great a deviation.
A New Law. The other legal drafting route is to strike out fresh under the 1996
Constitution Evaluated under the 1996 Constitution (and assuming the transitional imperative to
be expired), the sole AZAPO-recognized justification for the grant of civil and criminal immunitv
to individuals as well as to political organisations is that of providing for full disclosure of the
truth This is regarded as a compensatory benefit for the limitation of the rights of the victims
Thus, if the drafters of a collective amnesty choose the replacement rather than amendment
option, then the specific procedures of the new legislation can be justified solely on the rather
slender basis of whether or not they will provide for the full disclosure of information regarding
gross human rights violations such that it provides a compensatory benefit to the victims. Such
grants of immunity — which could theoretically cover acts committed since 1994 — cannot be
justified in terms of the transitional imperative Given the thin justification for such a limitation or.
the right of victims, it may well be necessary for the drafters of a new law to consider an
amendment to the 1996 Constitution to ensure the constitutionality of the second amnesty.
' Additionally, one would be the need to assess the logistics of resuscitating the TRC
Ore might have thought that the TRC in particular was an organization that would exist only for
limited period of time But the same was the current thinking about the Independent Electora'
Commission, originally created in terms of the pre-constitutional legislation and which, contra:.
to :ne predictions of its demise, reached its fifth birthday on 2 June 1999. State organisations
ha i a habit of persistence
Check date
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Depending on this justification also poses an empirical question for designing a process of
collective amnesty: what procedures are both least restrictive of the rights of victims and most
suited to encouraging full disclosure of the truth? Additional elements of publicity and a
reparations regime and victims' right to participation in the process will clearly argue in favour of
the Act's constitutionality. In any case, the institutional forum charged with implementing the
amnesty law must be an independent and impartial decisionmaker with the power to determine
that specific actions fall within the terms of the amnesty legislation Either the ordinary courts or
an appropriate tribunal could fit that definition.
Furthermore, in drafting a new law, the grant of immunity from civil and criminal liability
to the State would not be able to take advantage of this disclosure of truth rationale. It would
thus rest solely on the extremely dubious basis of Mahomed J's preference for starving school
children over greedy insurance companies. In order for such an assertion to be accepted by the
Court as a justification for limiting the victims' right in terms of the limitations clause analysis,
such an argument would require solid evidence backing it up Without some sort of research
findings that indeed only insurance companies and not the actual victims would benefit, new
amnesty legislation cannot extend constitutionally to providing immunity from liability to the State
itself
Thus, under either the drafting afresh or the amendment route, the destination reached
looks a bit the same: organisations may apply for immunity as long as either a court or a tribunal
is determining whether specific acts fall within the terms of the amnesty legislation While the
starting afresh route as compared to the amendment route would have the potential "advantage
of covering gross human rights violations committed since 1994. a new law would suffer the
disadvantage of not being justifiable in terms of the transitional imperative and risking the
necessity of a constitutional amendment Both forms would not be able to grant immunity for
acts not determined to fall within the terms of the amnesty legislation by an independent and
impartial decisionmaker.
IV. The Broader Constitutionality of a Second Organizational Amnesty
And what of the second organizational amnesty in terms of more sociological definition of
constitutionality? To evaluate the second organizational amnesty ir. these terms, we will need to
look at the process of coming to a second amnesty
It is obviously hard to look at a process that has been bareh begun But it is does seem
significant that it is both an idea that persons are caring about opposing and one that has not been
put firmly in the public domain. One could find evidence already in ;his process to argue that the
transparency of the state and its willingness for a wide range of per-ons to participate in its
decision and constitution-making processes has declined from its height during the days of
transition to the present. Without necessarily making that argumer:. it seems likely that a nun~.Hc
of persons may well find the very character of the policy-making pr:cess around a second
amnesty to be an important indicator cf a less open South African . . nstituiionalism. By
the extent of popular participation in formal institutions of constitution-making (o." constitution-
amending), the character of South African constitutionalism is altered
A second amnesty in the form of a collective amnesty would be an organizational amnesty
but one in a very different sense from the TRC process. The TRC prpcess engaged with different
organizational sectors of South African society and where such organizational sectors did not
exist itself provided the organizational focus. In so doing, the TRC process contributed, at least
to some extent, to popular and elite participation in formal institutions of constitution-making.
However, a second amnesty such as presently being discussed risks being organizational in a
completely different sense by excusing all members of certain political organisations. This would
undoubtedly support the present strong role of party political organisations. The alternative is to
provide a forum in which organizational responsibility is acknowledged and immunity is given
with respect to acts determined to fall within the scope of the amnesiy.legislation
V. Looking Forward?
There may be other legal avenues to more or less the same end point as one is led to by
amnesty legislation in either form as considered above A programme based either in the office of
the National Director of Prosecution or in the office of the President could exercise a discretion
respectively to either forego prosecution in exchange for full disclosure of information or to
pardon those convicted from any criminal liability ! The doctrine of prescription may well serve
to limit potential claims against political organisations or other persons at least where the facts of
the claim have been known for some time (as is potentially the case with the ANC given its earlier
public investigations into its own human rights record) and thereby to make the need for a second
amnesty less compelling
Writing on the topic of a second amnesty in the Business Day. Jonny Steinberg (1999)
recently argued that a second amnesty law will likely provide a crucial test case for the
Constitutional Cour. If such a case were to occur, the episode might indeed fill in at least one of
the missing facets of constitutionality I earlier identified: what role will the judiciary assume in the
long term in South Africa's constitutional democracy'1 But I am not so sure that such a sharp
confrontation is necessarily coming. There may well be a number of turnings-off on the road to a
potential Constitutional Court decision on a second amnesty law. The doctrinal constitutionality
of such z law may te ensured by an amendment to :he 1996 Constitution in one respect or
another. Additional A. perhaps more optimistically, the shape of the new amnesty law dike the old
one) will be shaped at least to some extent by popular and elite participation in its drafting
process. Constitutionalism cannot be left in the domain of legal doctrine.
* One docirnal ;ue?::on raised is whether = pardon has the effect of immunitv iron". :ivil
liability as well
References
Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO) v President of the Republic of South Africa 1996(4)
SA671(CC).
DiMaggio, P, and Powell, W. 1991. The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Klaaren. J 1997 'Structures of Government in the 1996 Constitution: Putting Democracy Back
into Human Rights" South African Journal on Human Rights I J 3-27
Klaaren, J 1998. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the South African Judiciary, and
Constitutionalism" African Studies 57(2): 197-208
Klare, K. 1998. 'Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism.'" South African Journal
on Human Rights 14: 146-88.
Klug, H. 1996. "Participating in the Design: Constitution-Making in South Africa " Review of
Constitutional Studies 3: 18-59
Steinberg. J. 1991. "Amnesty Quandry Looms For Judges " Business Day Tuesday, June 8,
1999, p."ll.
13
